The relationship between Turkey and Israel has been complicated, with both cooperation and tensions over the decades. While Turkey was the first Muslim-majority country to recognize Israel in 1949, relations have fluctuated based on changing political dynamics. Getting to the heart of the question “does Turkey support Israel?” requires a nuanced understanding of their turbulent history.
Early Optimism
In the early years after Turkey recognized Israel, relations were positive. Israel provided agricultural and military assistance to Turkey, while Turkey gave Israel much-needed trade access to the Middle East. Some even saw the two countries as natural allies, as they were both non-Arab states in a difficult neighborhood.
In the 1990s, as the peace process advanced, ties strengthened. Leaders exchanged visits, trade and tourism boomed, and the two countries engaged in military exercises together. There was hope that Turkey could play a constructive role in mediating between Israel and Palestine.
Deterioration After 2008
This initial optimism faded after Israel’s 2008 war against Hamas in Gaza. Turkey strongly condemned Israel’s actions, accusing it of state terrorism against Palestinians. Protests erupted across Turkey ratcheting up public pressure on the government.
While Turkey had criticized Israeli policies before its tone now hardened considerably. The relationship was dealt a further blow during Israel’s 2009 war in Gaza, as Turkey banned Israel from joining a joint military exercise.
2010 Nadir
Ties hit a nadir in 2010 when Israeli forces raided a Turkish ship trying to break the blockade on Gaza Nine Turkish citizens were killed, sparking outrage in Turkey. Turkey withdrew its ambassador from Israel and sought to isolate it diplomatically.
At this point, Turkey began providing open support to Hamas, including giving its exiled leaders a base in Istanbul. Turkey also took Israel to court for the deaths of its citizens, further poisoning relations.
Fragile Renewal
After 6 years with minimal contact, Israel apologized to Turkey in 2013 for the 2010 raid, opening the door to reconciliation. The two countries began renewing security and intelligence cooperation in common cause against Iran and jihadist groups.
In 2016, ambassadors were exchanged again after a rapprochement deal. Turkey was hopeful that the personal ties between Erdogan and Israeli leaders could overcome political tensions.
Recent Downward Spiral
This renewal proved fragile, however. When Trump recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital in 2017, Erdogan threatened to cut ties once more. Disputes also emerged over gas drilling in the Mediterranean.
Erdogan has become more vocal in criticizing Israel’s policies toward Palestinians as he seeks to shore up political support at home. With each Gaza war, Turkey condemns Israel’s actions.
And in 2023, Turkey banned trade with Israel and threatened international legal action over alleged Israeli war crimes in Gaza. These moves signal Turkey has again distanced itself from Israel over Palestine.
Understanding Turkey’s Stance
So does Turkey support Israel? In short, no longer. But the full picture is complicated. Turkey still has extensive economic ties with Israel and relies on Israeli tourism. Its early embrace of Israel was groundbreaking in the region.
Yet today, with popular Turkish sympathy heavily on the Palestinian side, Turkey’s rhetoric and policies toward Israel often appear more hostile than friendly. This stems from a mix of principled objection toward Israeli policies in Gaza and the West Bank, domestic political considerations, and renewed regional rivalries.
The central challenge in reconciling Turkish-Israeli ties is that both value having positive relations with the other, but domestic opinion constrains how far they can cooperate. Until a peace settlement addresses Palestinian grievances, this tension will likely persist.
Turkey’s relationship with Israel and the Palestinian territories
KEVIN HUGGARD: What approach has Turkey traditionally taken toward Israeli-Palestinian affairs under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan? How does this issue fit into Turkey’s broader foreign policy?
ASLI AYDINTAŞBAŞ: The Palestinian issue is front and center to Erdoğan’s vision of where he wants to take Turkey.
As two of the non-Arab states in the region, Turkey and Israel have long been fascinated with one another and have enjoyed close ties for much of their 74-year relationship.
But over the past two decades under Erdoğan, relations have been tumultuous, often in parallel with the ups and downs in Israeli-Palestinian tensions. In 2009, Erdoğan walked out of a panel with Shimon Peres in Davos after accusing the former Israeli president of killing children. In 2010, a Turkish aid flotilla tried to break the blockade of Gaza, leading to a deadly Israeli raid and years of cold peace between the two countries.
Although Turkey and Israel normalized ties in 2022, relations have dramatically worsened since Hamas’ October 7 attack and Israel’s military operations in Gaza. Erdoğan has taken a very harsh stance against Israel and the two countries have recalled their ambassadors — though trade relations continue.
Under Erdoğan, Turkey’s approach to the Israeli-Palestinian issue is distinctly different from the pre-Erdoğan, Kemalist period in two ways.
The first is Erdoğan’s belief in the legitimacy of Hamas as a viable Palestinian actor, which is a natural outcome of his ideological affinity for the Muslim Brotherhood. Erdoğan believes Hamas needs to be part of the political process and has moved the Turkish establishment toward that idea. Hamas has had a presence in Turkey and sent delegations there since it won the Palestinian elections in 2006. I should note that Ankara’s engagement is with Hamas’ political wing; as far as I know, there has been no Turkish support for the group’s military wing in Gaza. But Erdoğan has been open about his political support for Hamas — whose political representatives were reportedly in Turkey at the time of the attack.
Another distinction from the pre-Erdoğan age is the central role of the Palestinian issue in Turkey’s aspirations for regional leadership — and Erdoğan’s use of neo-Ottomanism to sell that idea to Turkish voters. The Turkish president has built his political platform on the theme of an ascending Turkey — with a historic responsibility to protect the dispossessed Muslim populations in the region, including, of course, the Palestinians. This notion of Turkish exceptionalism runs through all of Erdoğan’s foreign policy speeches and is at the core of his “Century of Turkey” platform. It also works well domestically for the voters: Erdoğan is the only leader standing up to Israel and the West, we are often told. This is how he wants to be remembered, as the leader who oversaw the rebirth of the Turkish empire and who hasn’t forgotten the Palestinians and Jerusalem.
Turkey’s response to the crisis
KEVIN HUGGARD: How has Turkey responded to the present crisis? In your policy paper, you write that the evidence suggests that “the Turkish establishment views this as an inflection point, not a passing flare-up of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.” Given this, has the Turkish policy response thus far represented a departure from its traditional posture toward Israel-Palestine?
ASLI AYDINTAŞBAŞ: Erdoğan is known for his pragmatism and his skillful use of geopolitics to expand Turkey’s interests. When it suits his interests, he is willing to drop principles, reverse course, straddle between the West and Russia, reconcile with enemies, and so on. But not on the Palestinian issue. There is no pragmatism there. Erdoğan sees it as his calling to take a position against what Israel is doing, even if the price is isolation. It is clearly personal, ideological, and near and dear to his heart.
Turkey has taken the most strident anti-Israeli position within NATO, with Erdoğan organizing pro-Palestinian rallies himself and slamming both Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the United States. But he may have gone overboard this time. Erdoğan has called Hamas a “liberation movement” — openly stating “Hamas is not a terrorist organization” and accusing Israel of committing “genocide.” Of course, this is very different from what many Arab leaders have done, which is criticizing Israel for its disregard for Palestinian civilians while also keeping their distance from Hamas.
When I spoke to Turkish diplomats and officials, even secularists, I was struck by how deeply resentful of the U.S. approach they were. There is plenty of criticism of Western double standards when it comes to dealing with civilian casualties in Ukraine and Gaza.
I noticed something else in these conversations: Turks are not certain that the threat of regional war is gone. They see the U.S. military buildup in the Eastern Mediterranean not as a deterrent for Iran, which is what the Biden administration intends, but as a provocation for Iran and Russia. They seemed to think that this could still become a regional inflection point, with a new intifada or greater involvement by Iran’s proxies, and later Russia.
Turkey might enter Israel to help Palestinians: Erdogan
FAQ
Does Turkey support Palestine or Israel?
What is Turkey’s relationship with Israel?
Does Turkey support Iran or Israel?
Which country is supporting Israel?
Does Turkey support the Palestinians?
But support for the Palestinians and anger at Israel’s prosecution of the war in Gaza are common in Turkish society. Israel’s foreign minister, Israel Katz, struck back at Mr. Erdogan on Sunday, accusing him on social media of following in the footsteps of Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi strongman who was executed in 2006. Mr.
Does Turkey have a relationship with Israel?
Turkey has had turbulent relations with Israel during Mr. Erdogan’s two decades as its dominant politician, often tied to Mr. Erdogan’s anger over the Israeli treatment of Palestinians. But recently, Mr. Erdogan made steps at rapprochement with the Jewish state.
Is Turkey a better partner than Israel?
In the ensuing months, Turkey, facing regional isolation, economic woes, and a potentially hostile president in the White House, showed itself the more eager partner. Israel, enjoying growing ties with Turkey’s rivals and insistent on seeing evidence that Ankara wouldn’t pull an about-face, was content to sit back.
Does Turkey help fight Israeli fire?
“Turkey Helps Fight Israeli Fire”. WSJ. Archived from the original on 7 March 2016. Retrieved 17 April 2016. ^ “Turkey requests foreign quake aid amid lack of tents – Diplomacy – Worldbulletin News”.