Earlier this month, Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis visited Ankara for talks with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.
But the mood heading into the meeting was difficult to gauge, as just days before the two leaders met, Turkey officially reopened a United Nations World Heritage Site as a mosque (the Kariye Camii)—a location that, before it was turned into a mosque during Ottoman rule and a museum in 1945, was originally a prominent Byzantine church (the Church of St. Saviour in Chora). In response, Greece lodged a démarche to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).
In the past, such embittered instances between Turkey and Greece had fed a repeating cycle of mutual suspicion and angry rhetoric. But the prime minister’s visit to Ankara went ahead as planned. Although the press conference revealed the leaders’ disagreements, their decision to highlight their different takes on the Hamas-Israel war instead of lingering on bilateral disputes demonstrates their desire to maintain a positive momentum.
This is remarkable, given that the two NATO allies almost came to the brink of conflict in the summer of 2020, averted through some shrewd diplomacy and cool-headed maneuvring. The list of bilateral disputes has gotten longer: the Cyprus problem remains——but in recent years, new disputes such as competing claims to energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean have been added to the list of bilateral disputes. As Greece reinforced defense and energy cooperation with the United States, France, and Israel, Turkey accused Greece of a maximalist position in the Eastern Mediterranean, while calling on Athens to demilitarize the Aegean islands.
Tensions rose after Turkey sent a seismic research ship, accompanied by gunboats, to waters contested by Greece and Cyprus and signed a controversial maritime boundary treaty with the former Government of National Accord in Libya, angering nearby countries in the area. Moreover, Ankara’s decision to open Turkey’s border with Greece in February 2020 for migrant travel into Europe, and Greece’s refusal to allow passage into the country, added to the tension, as police from both countries fired tear gas at their shared border, eventually leading to the construction of a twenty-five-mile fence and surveillance system along the border. As these tensions built up over time, Greece’s official position remained that the two countries’ sole differences lie in delimiting the continental shelf and their respective exclusive economic zones, and that failure to agree bilaterally on these issues should lead the two nations to arbitration through the International Court of Justice in The Hague.
The devastating February 2023 earthquakes in Turkey and Syria paved the way for an attempt to reset relations. Greece was among the first countries to pledge support to Turkey, and the then Greek foreign minister rushed to visit his Turkish counterpart and tour the affected region, pledging support from the European Union (EU). A few months later, Mitsotakis and Erdoğan got a fresh mandate in their countries’ respective elections, effectively freeing them to act independent of electoral calculations. In that context in December 2023, a large Turkish delegation of ministers and businesspeople, headed by Erdoğan, traveled to Athens. The two sides signed a total of fifteen bilateral agreements including the Athens Declaration, a nonbinding political document committing the two sides to boosting their friendship and cultivating good neighborly relations.
Greece and Turkey pursue dialogue on three levels: first is the so-called “positive agenda” of cooperation on trade, education, research, and tourism among others. The two countries have pledged to double their bilateral trade volume to ten billion dollars and agreed to setting up a Greek-Turkish Business Forum. Greece’s decision to extend tourist visas to Turkish citizens to visit select eastern Aegean islands all year round aims at boosting people-to-people ties; it is also a recognition of Ankara’s intensified cooperation with Greek and EU authorities on migration, one of the many areas of common concern, as such an arrangement likely required EU approval.
The second level relates to confidence-building measures, for example to avoid tension over the Aegean Sea through agreements on the rules of military drills and training exercises and the creation of a hotline between the two countries’ military and civilian headquarters. Talks resumed in 2023 after a long hiatus and have so far led to calm over the Aegean. Such calm makes economic, as well as political, sense: Dogfights are expensive, and both sides would rather invest in health, education, and services that support busy tourist seasons.
The third level is the political dialogue to address the already thorny bilateral disputes that have been around for decades. Substantial progress on this front has not been achieved and will require solid preparation, political courage, and a desire to compromise on issues that both sides have grown accustomed to viewing as nonnegotiable.
The relationship between the United States, Greece, and Turkey is complex and has evolved significantly over time. While all three countries are members of NATO, tensions and conflicting interests have often strained relations between them. In recent years, as provocations by Turkey against Greece have increased, observers have questioned where US loyalties lie if a crisis emerges. Examining the history and current status of these triangular dynamics helps provide context for understanding the US’s delicate position.
Historical Background
The US has a long history of military and economic partnerships with both Greece and Turkey. During the Cold War the US valued both countries as strategic allies against the Soviet Union. However tensions between Greece and Turkey over issues like Cyprus compelled the US to often act as an intermediary.
The 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus was a major inflection point that damaged US relations with both countries Greece withdrew from NATO structures for a time, while the US imposed an arms embargo on Turkey Still, shared NATO interests brought the parties back together. This pattern of US mediation persisted for decades.
Shifting Priorities After the Cold War
In the post-Cold War period, the US relationship with Turkey grew closer, especially after Turkey helped the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. Issues like Turkey’s human rights record and relations with Russia caused occasional rifts, but security cooperation continued.
Meanwhile, US-Greece ties strengthened after low points during Greece’s economic crisis. The US has increased military collaboration to counter an aggressive Russia. In 2019, the two countries signed a new defense cooperation agreement.
Diverging Views of US Intentions
These warming US-Greece ties have been viewed positively in Greece as a balancing measure against regional instability. But Turkey sees them as threatening, claiming the US wants to undermine Turkey through Greece and restrict its regional influence.
Conspiracy theories abound in Turkey about US intentions to weaken or even destroy the country. This hostile stance complicates prospects for US mediation in Greek-Turkish tensions.
Current US Policy Balancing Act
Recent bellicose rhetoric by Turkish President Erdogan toward Greece has put the US in an awkward position. Turkey’s value as a strategic regional partner limits how forcefully the US can denounce its provocations against a fellow NATO member.
The US tries to walk a fine line, gently admonishing Turkey while reiterating the need for allied unity. But if Turkey escalates against Greece, the US may be compelled to back Greece more unequivocally.
Path Forward: Complex Choices
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The US likely wants to preserve relations with both Greece and Turkey if possible. But rising tensions may force it to pick sides.
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Outright Turkish aggression against Greece could trigger US and NATO defense commitments toward Greece.
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More explicit US support for Greece could permanently damage US-Turkey ties and NATO cohesion.
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Alternatively, failing to aid Greece could badly undermine US credibility as an ally.
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Managing Turkey’s regional aspirations while supporting Greece will require deft diplomacy and difficult trade-offs.
The US-Greece-Turkey strategic triangle has grown more fraught as Turkish policy has become more muscular. While past crises were defused through US mediation, changed perceptions in Turkey surrounding US intentions create doubts about whether history can repeat itself. As Turkish assertiveness increases, the US may face a dilemma between supporting ally Greece and maintaining a partnership with Turkey. With skillful diplomacy and clearly communicated red lines, the US may still be able to deter uncontrolled escalation. But it will be a serious challenge requiring nuanced policy.
US Supporting Greece against Turkey
FAQ
Is Greece an ally of Turkey?
Who is Turkey’s strongest ally?
Does NATO support Turkey or Greece?
Does us support Greece?
Should the US mediate and manage tensions between Turkey and Greece?
The United States should, in a neutral manner, mediate and manage tensions between the two countries. Both Turkey and Greece, as well as the region, need US engagement. No other country or entity is in a position to mediate, support, or, if necessary, pressure the two sides to productively coexist.
Why did the US and Greece sign a defense cooperation agreement?
WASHINGTON (AP) — The United States and Greece signed a deal Thursday expanding their defense cooperation agreement to grant U.S. forces broader use of Greek bases, as that nation deals with tensions between it and neighboring Turkey.
Is Greece ready to’reset’ relations with Turkey?
More than half the world’s population sees AP journalism every day. Greece’s prime minister says his country is ready to “reset” relations with neighbor Turkey in an effort to bypass decades-old disputes between the two NATO members.
Why was Washington a preferred mediator between Greece and Turkey?
Washington endured as the preferred mediator between Greece and Turkey after a string of territorial disputes in the Aegean in the 1970s and 1980s. As it had earlier in the Cold War, shared concerns over NATO’s integrity provided a base for negotiations between Washington, Ankara, and Athens.