President Erdogan’s recent troubles with the United States have prevented Turkey from playing a potentially constructive role in the early phases of the Israel-Hamas war.
The timing and scope of the war between Israel and Hamas have put Turkey and its president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in a challenging situation. More From Our Experts
At first, shocked by the violence perpetrated by Hamas, Erdogan reached out to his Israeli counterpart, Isaac Herzog. However, the strength of public support for Hamas in Turkey, the mobilization of the Israeli military, and the start of the Israeli aerial offensive in the Gaza Strip almost immediately made him shift his position. The tone of his criticism of Israel for its campaign in the Gaza Strip has progressively become more strident.
This has not prevented Erdogan from seeking to play a mediation role; he initiated several phone calls to regional leaders, UN Secretary-General António Guterres, and Russian President Vladimir Putin. Missing was U.S. President Joe Biden. Meanwhile, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken launched a whirlwind tour of regional capitals as soon as the crisis erupted, seeking ways to prevent further deterioration. He appears to have deliberately sidestepped a visit to Ankara, preferring to confer with the Turkish foreign minister, Hakan Fidan, by telephone. The Biden-Erdogan relationship has been strained for some time; Biden, too, has limited his contacts with Erdogan and been unwilling to invite him, for instance, for a state visit to Washington.
Turkey has made headlines recently for threats by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to militarily intervene in various conflicts, raising the specter of war But how likely is Turkey to actually enter into full-scale warfare? An analysis of the rhetoric versus the reality provides some perspective
Threats Towards Israel
Tensions flared between Turkey and Israel this summer during Israel’s military operation in Gaza. Erdogan made provocative comments alluding to potential Turkish intervention, comparing Israeli actions to “genocide” and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Hitler.
While concerning, this type of fiery rhetoric from Erdogan is not new. Turkey and Israel have traded insults before especially during times of heightened tensions. However Turkey has not taken serious steps to mobilize its military against Israel.
Erdogan’s comments are likely meant more for domestic political purposes, to bolster his strongman image, than as an actual threat of war. Still, with emotions running high, miscalculations remain a risk. Cooler heads in Ankara and Jerusalem would be wise to prevail.
Involvement in Regional Conflicts
Beyond words, Turkey has shown a willingness to deploy military force in regional conflicts like Syria, Iraq, Libya and Azerbaijan.
Turkey argues these interventions are limited responses to specific security threats. However, critics see neo-Ottoman ambitions to project power and influence.
While concerning, Turkey’s actions fall short of all-out war. The interventions leverage Turkey’s military advantage with limited engagement avoiding major escalation.
Turkey deploys this “hard power” selectively and pragmatically. But operational overreach remains a hazard if situations spiral out of control.
Strong Rhetoric on Ukraine
Erdogan has walked a fine line on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. While condemning Moscow’s actions, Ankara has avoided joining Western sanctions.
This balancing act reflects Turkey’s complex economic and geopolitical ties with both Russia and Ukraine. But Erdogan’s rhetoric has turned increasingly hostile recently, even warning of Turkish offensive action.
A direct Turkish military confrontation with nuclear-armed Russia still seems unlikely. But with nationalist passions aroused, unintended clashes cannot be ruled out.
What’s Driving Turkey’s New Assertiveness?
Several factors explain Turkey’s new forceful stance:
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Erdogan’s strongman leadership style prizes displays of power and strength. With popularity declining amid economic woes, military adventurism could provide a distraction or rallying point.
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Turkey has invested heavily in domestic defense industries and seeks to highlight new military capabilities.
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Regional power vacuums created by U.S. retrenchment provide space for Turkish ambitions.
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Turkey sees opportunities to fill leadership roles in the Muslim world. Military activism could further raise Ankara’s profile.
The Risks of War Remain Real
While restraint has prevailed so far, the risks of a major Turkish conflict should not be dismissed. Several danger points persist:
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Overheated rhetoric could box leaders into escalatory paths not fully intended. Passions stirred up are hard to cool.
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Military mobilizations and deployments could lead to accidental clashes and trigger uncontrolled spirals.
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Turkey may overestimate its capabilities and underestimate risks and costs of conflicts. Wars rarely go as planned.
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Alliance commitments could force Turkey’s hand in a wider conflagration, overriding caution. NATO membership is a wild card.
Prospects for Peace and Stability
Despite valid concerns, there are also countervailing forces for peace and restraint:
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Turkey has much to lose economically from prolonged conflicts. Pragmatic business lobbies advocate caution.
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Turkish military leadership retains institutional instincts for prudence and avoidance of major war.
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Strong diplomatic and economic ties with many partners could be jeopardized, counselling restraint.
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Public war fatigue from past conflicts in Iraq, Syria and the Kurdish regions tamps down jingoism.
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The current war between Israel and Hamas comes as Turkey and the United States are already at loggerheads over several issues. The most critical is Washington’s support for the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), predominantly Kurdish fighters who have been the United States’ primary allies in the fight against the self-proclaimed Islamic State, also known as ISIS. On October 5, this dispute reached a nadir when an American F-16 fighter aircraft shot down a Turkish drone that came within a few hundred yards of U.S. forces in northern Syria.
The Turkish military has been conducting numerous military operations—on the ground and in the air against the Syrian Kurds—that Washington perceives as undermining the fight against the Islamic State. Turkey is adamant in branding the Syrian Kurdish forces as nothing more than an extension of its own Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which Ankara and its allies have designated a terrorist organization. The U.S.-Turkey disagreement over the issue goes back to the advent of the Islamic State and its sweep through northern Syria and Iraq in 2014. Erdogan turned down U.S. President Barack Obama’s request to help fight terrorist groups, forcing the United States to work with the SDF. American forces and the SDF successfully defeated the Islamic State. However, in the absence of any state authority in northern Syria, Washington kept some nine hundred troops there and cooperated with the SDF to contain the Islamic State. The SDF also maintains a camp, al-Hol, that houses some fifty-thousand individuals with various links to the Islamic State. More From Our Experts
Turkey recently also took umbrage at the language used by the Biden administration in an October 12 statement renewing the state of emergency in northern Syria. The statement’s wording was identical to that of one issued by U.S. President Donald Trump in 2019, though it did not elicit the same derision in Ankara then. The new White House statement said:
The two countries have also been at odds over Sweden’s accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Erdogan took advantage of the ratification process to make a series of demands of Sweden before agreeing to send the accession resolution to the Turkish parliament, which he formally did on October 23. While Sweden made several concessions, ratification by Turkey has been overshadowed by Ankara’s request that Washington allow it to purchase new F-16s and modernization kits for the existing ones in its inventory.
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The Biden administration’s strong support for the request has met stiff resistance in the U.S. Congress. Congressional leaders have made clear that the sale of F-16s is unlikely to be approved unless Turkey ratifies Sweden’s accession. In the aftermath of the U.S. government’s critical October 12 statement, Congress’s efforts to create a linkage to the F-16 sale, and increased tensions over the Israel-Hamas war, it is possible that the Turkish parliament—goaded by Erdogan behind the scenes—could delay its ratification of Swedish accession.
The onset of the conflict in Gaza has further estranged Erdogan from Washington. He reacted indignantly to the U.S. deployment of two aircraft carrier strike groups to the Eastern Mediterranean and suggested that the United States has no business sending the carriers or playing a role in this conflict. He also claimed that the carriers’ presence interferes with Turkey’s efforts to resolve the crisis. Erdogan’s foreign policy discourse increasingly reflects growing mistrust of the West and the United States. Starting with the 2016 coup attempt in Turkey, for which he blames Washington, he has also complained that Turkey’s poor economic performance is caused by Western (i.e., American) interference and sabotage. Yet, an analysis of Turkey’s trade statistics would demonstrate that its most consequential trading partners are Western ones. In 2022, the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom (UK), and ten European Union countries received almost 43 percent of Turkish exports. In 2021, five countries—the United States, Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland, and the UK—accounted for almost two-thirds of foreign direct investment into Turkey.
Erdogan has long supported Hamas, allowing its leaders to reside in Turkey and meet with its leadership, and he has refused to characterize the organization’s actions as terrorism. The Turkish public’s reaction, egged on by Erdogan, to the current conflict in Gaza is likely to strengthen this relationship. Still, Erdogan’s sympathies for Hamas notwithstanding, he is also acutely aware that a major conflagration in the region would be detrimental to everyone, Turkey included. This explains why he reportedly warned his Iranian counterpart, Ebrahim Raisi, against steps that would increase tensions.
With no end to the conflict in sight, Erdogan also faces the prospect of relations deteriorating further with Israel and the United States. Demonstrations in Turkey have targeted U.S. installations—most importantly, the Kürecik radar base in Malatya, in southeastern Turkey. And the American consulate in Adana, in southern Turkey, was forced to shut down. Erdogan’s rhetoric vis-à-vis the United States is partially responsible for these events. Although some commentators have suggested that he has tried to distance himself from Hamas, in a speech on October 25, he pointedly argued that Hamas is not a terrorist organization but a group of freedom fighters and “mujahideen,” or people fighting for their faith. He also invited all Turkish citizens to a “Greater Palestine” demonstration in Istanbul that he will lead on October 28.
Erdogan could have initially contributed much to the search for a compromise in this conflict. He has eschewed the little trust Washington may have had in him with the stridency of his anti-American language. He appears to have dealt himself out of the U.S.-led negotiations.
Turkey might enter Israel to help Palestinians: Erdogan
FAQ
Is Turkey at risk of war?
Is Turkey involved in the war?
Is Turkey an ally to Russia?
Is Turkey no longer a US ally?
Will Turkey exacerbate the war in Ukraine?
ANKARA, March 12 (Reuters) – Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan said on Tuesday any steps that would exacerbate the war in Ukraine and possibly spread the conflict to NATO must be avoided, adding he would host Russian President Vladimir Putin after elections later this month. NATO member Turkey supports Ukraine’s territorial integrity.
Are Turkey and Greece going to a war?
Deep-rooted friction brought Turkey and Greece almost to the point of war three times in the last 50 years. Analysts speaking to VOA say they don’t see a resolution any time soon, noting the troubled history of bilateral relations and the “tight politics” in the two nations’ capitals.
What happened to Turkey during the Cold War?
There was talk of war over the straits, which control passage between the Aegean and the Mediterranean seas, but in the end Russia accepted the status quo. And then came Stalin’s end. But the picture did not change much in the coming decades. Turkey, alongside Greece, had by now become one of the frontiers of the cold war.
Is Turkey threatening a land invasion in Syria?
In late October Turkey launched an operation targeting Kurdish forces in Syria and Iraq and is currently threatening a land invasion into the Kurdish regions of Syria. Russia is the Syrian government’s main ally, and the US is backing the Kurds in northern Syria.