Are Turkey and Israel Allies? A Complex Relationship Explained
The relationship between Turkey and Israel has been complicated and turbulent over the past few decades. Though the two countries were allies for much of the 20th century, tensions began simmering in the 2000s and eventually boiled over after Israel’s 2008-2009 war in Gaza. Relations hit rock bottom in 2010 when Israeli commandos killed Turkish activists aboard the Gaza freedom flotilla. Diplomatic ties were downgraded and angry rhetoric flew between Ankara and Jerusalem.
However in 2016 the two countries started a reconciliation process and eventually reinstated full diplomatic relations in 2022. This rapprochement was driven by shifting geopolitics and shared interests in containing Iran. Though far from the warm partnership of decades past, Turkey and Israel are no longer sworn enemies. Cooperation in certain areas has resumed even as substantial disputes remain unresolved.
So are Turkey and Israel allies today? The short answer is…it’s complicated. While strategic priorities have brought the two countries closer and dialogue channels are open, the relationship is delicately balanced and could easily deteriorate again. Divergent policies toward the Palestinians, lingering resentment, and Erdoğan’s strident rhetoric against Israel could undo recent progress. The Turkish-Israeli alliance is dormant rather than dead, but full restoration depends on forthcoming leaders and regional developments.
Allied Against Common Threats (1949-2008)
Turkey recognized Israel shortly after its founding in 1948, becoming the first Muslim-majority nation to do so. Throughout the Cold War, the two countries were aligned with the West against Soviet influence in the Middle East. Turkey also benefitted from military and intelligence cooperation with Israel, which helped modernize its armed forces.
This alignment continued after the Cold War, with Turkey and Israel cooperating closely to counter shared regional threats. They collaborated against Syria, negotiated arms deals, held joint military exercises, and formed a strategic regional partnership with the United States. Israeli tourists flocked to Turkey’s Mediterranean coast while Turkish construction firms undertook major projects in Israel.
Cracks Emerge Over Gaza (2008-2010)
However, Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (AKP), which came to power in 2002, took a more assertive stance in regional affairs. The AKP leadership expressed solidarity with the Palestinian cause and forged closer ties with Hamas.
Tensions boiled over during Israel’s 2008-2009 war in Gaza. Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan fiercely condemned Israel’s military operations, accusing it of crimes against humanity. At the 2009 Davos summit, Erdoğan stormed off stage after an angry exchange with Israeli President Shimon Peres.
The final break came in May 2010 when Israeli naval commandos raided a Turkish ship trying to break the blockade on Gaza. The raid killed 10 Turkish activists, provoking outrage in Turkey. Erdoğan accused Israel of “state terrorism” while large protests erupted in Istanbul.
Freezing of Relations (2011-2016)
In September 2011, Turkey downgraded diplomatic ties with Israel and suspended military agreements. Erdoğan threatened to send Turkish navy ships to escort future aid flotillas to Gaza. The following year, Erdoğan called Zionism “a crime against humanity.”
Over the next few years, Turkish-Israeli relations reached their nadir. Erdoğan continued his scathing attacks on Israel’s policies toward Gaza and called for lifting the blockade. Turkey also voiced support for Hamas, which Israel and the U.S. designate as a terrorist organization.
Israeli tourism to Turkey collapsed as Erdoğan’s rhetoric resonated with anti-Israeli sentiments among the Turkish public. While some trade continued behind the scenes, arms deals, intelligence sharing, and military cooperation were frozen. Turkey’s alignment with Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood soured relations with other regional powers like Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The strategic partnership between Turkey, Israel and the U.S. was in tatters.
Rapprochement amid Shifting Priorities (2016-2022)
However, Turkey’s foreign policy overreach eventually prompted a course correction. Erdoğan’s efforts to position Turkey as the champion of the Arab street during the 2011 uprisings had largely failed. Seeking to mend strained ties in the region, Ankara initiated a reconciliation process with Israel in 2016.
What motivated this Turkish shift? Several factors were at play:
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Containing Iran: With conflicts raging in Syria and Iraq, Turkey and Israel shared an interest in preventing Iran’s regional ascendance. Mending fences would strengthen their hand.
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Access to energy: Normalized ties opened the door for potential Turkish-Israeli cooperation on energy projects in the Eastern Mediterranean.
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Restoring U.S. ties: President Obama encouraged the reconciliation to rebuild regional cooperation with two key allies.
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Turkish economy: Erdoğan likely calculated that renewed ties with Israel could attract crucial Israeli tourism and investment.
In August 2016, the two countries announced a deal restoring ambassadors and full diplomatic relations. While Erdogan continued criticizing Israeli policies toward Gaza, the inflammatory rhetoric was dialed down.
Over the next few years, high-level meetings took place between Israeli and Turkish officials. Military and intelligence links were reestablished. The reconciliation deal held despite tensions continuing to flare periodically, especially during escalations between Israel and Hamas.
The relationship progressed substantially when normal ambassadorial activities resumed in early 2022 after a new civilian government took charge in Israel. There was optimism that wider cooperation on regional issues, energy, and trade could follow. Defense and tourism links were also restored.
Uneasy Balance Today (2022 Onward)
So where do things currently stand? The rapprochement has reset ties from their previous rock bottom, reopening dialogue channels and areas of cooperation. But the foundations remain fragile.
Despite the diplomatic thaw, Turkish and Israeli leaders still harbor resentment and suspicion. The tone at the top matters greatly, and Erdoğan continues his occasional diatribes, such as a 2022 speech blasting Israel’s “terror state.”
Turkey maintains ties with Hamas and advocates strongly for the Palestinian cause. Ankara was harshly critical of Israel during the May 2021 Gaza war. These stances resonate domestically but hamper closer Turkish-Israeli cooperation.
While intelligence sharing has resumed, arms deals remain off the table. Israeli tourist arrivals are just a fraction of pre-2010 levels. Turkey blocks Israel’s accession to the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum.
In other words, while no longer completely estranged, Turkey and Israel aren’t fully reconciled allies either. Their current modus vivendi is an uneasy equilibrium dependent on leaders refraining from inflammatory actions or rhetoric. There are promising areas for selective cooperation but also potential flashpoints threatening renewed hostility.
The relationship seems stable for now, but could easily deteriorate again during the next crisis between Israel and Hamas. Ultimately, absent leaders willing to tackle political discord, Turkish-Israeli relations may remain in limbo, balancing precariously between conflict and cooperation.
The Path Ahead
What could the future hold? The trajectory depends significantly on elections and leadership change on both sides:
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A new coalition replacing Netanyahu could improve prospects for deeper reconciliation with Turkey. But opposition to Erdoğan remains strong in Israel.
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Erdoğan’s departure could also allow a reset. But an anti-Western successor might undo recent progress.
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Alternately, Erdoğan may moderate positions and rhetoric in his final years to consolidate the openings achieved through rapprochement.
Broader regional shifts will also impact the relationship:
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Growing alignment with the UAE and Saudi Arabia may sway Turkey to downplay Palestinian issues.
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But Iran’s nuclear advances may also push Turkey and Israel closer to counter a shared threat.
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New energy finds in disputed Mediterranean waters could spark fresh tensions.
The Turkish-Israeli partnership of the 1990s is unlikely to fully bloom again soon. But selective cooperation driven by strategic interests will likely continue. Managing differences over Palestine while expanding economic and security cooperation is achievable with pragmatic leadership on both sides. The on-off relationship has survived greater challenges before.
So in essence, are Turkey and Israel allies today? Yes and no. This complex bilateral relationship defies simplistic categorization. The estranged allies are no longer sworn enemies, but neither are they trusted friends. Whether their uneasy peace blossoms into a warmer partnership or collapses into renewed rancor may ultimately hinge on unpredictable regional events beyond their control. Either way, the Turkey-Israel rollercoaster ride seems far from over.
Palestinian actors and Turkey’s Islamist-secular divide
KEVIN HUGGARD: Does the Islamist-secular divide in Turkish politics inform which Palestinian actors Turkish leaders are likely to support (i.e., the main Islamist group, Hamas, or the primary secular nationalist one, Fatah)? Or does support for the Palestinian cause generally transcend those ideological divides in Turkey?
ASLI AYDINTAŞBAŞ: I think the Palestinian cause now transcends the Islamist-secular divide.
For the government, the ideological battle has long been settled in favor of Hamas. While Turkey deals with both Fatah and Hamas and has at times hosted Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas and Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh simultaneously, the PA is viewed as an ineffective entity — and Hamas a reality. In that sense, Turkey has elevated and legitimized Hamas’s position within the Muslim world.
But I don’t know what all that means for the future. We have no idea what Israelis are planning for Gaza or what type of a postwar Gaza administration will emerge. Qatar and Turkey will continue to deal with Hamas’ political wing. But if the PA steps in to take control of Gaza, meetings with Haniyeh or other Hamas leaders could be irrelevant.
For me, the real question is: will Turkey recalibrate and tone down its language on Hamas in order to have the type of access it wants in Gaza and the West Bank?
Turkish elite vs. societal opinion
KEVIN HUGGARD: To what extent is the Turkish political response to this crisis driven by bottom-up societal demands as opposed to the top-down needs of its political leaders?
ASLI AYDINTAŞBAŞ: No doubt the public is very sensitive to this issue — and in full sympathy with Palestinians. For the ordinary citizen, there is nonstop coverage of the suffering in Gaza and rolling commentary that Israel is able to do this because the United States allows it.
Public criticism of Hamas in the early days after the October 7 carnage is long gone. The picture that emerges in the public conversation is black and white, of the oppressor and the oppressed, with no nuance and barely a memory of what happened on October 7. There is also growing anti-Americanism for what is perceived as the United States’ blank check for Israel.
Erdoğan amplifies those sentiments and brings in an element of legitimization for Hamas by making the case that Hamas is not a terrorist organization. In doing this, he has been able to mold the public’s outlook on the issue: According to polling data from Metropoll, only 30% of respondents believe that Hamas is a terrorist organization.
This conflict has also allowed Erdoğan to make a case about a civilizational rift with the West. He calls it “crusader vs crescent” and of course, Turkey is on the side of the crescent. I worry that more and more people in Turkey are now buying this civilizational argument and think of Turkey as separate from the liberal order — which is described as immoral, bigoted, and hypocritical. I believe that the conflict in Gaza has just pushed Turkish society a few more inches towards the idea of a non-aligned Turkey.
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