Israel and Turkey have had a rollercoaster relationship over the past few decades. On the surface, they appear to be allies – both are democracies in a volatile region, share economic ties, and have cooperated militarily and in intelligence. However, behind closed doors, tensions and distrust have strained the friendship between these two Mediterranean powers.
A Budding Alliance
Israel and Turkey established full diplomatic relations in 1949, just a year after Israel gained independence. As the first and only majority-Muslim nation to recognize Israel at the time, Turkey gained a reputation as being more Western-oriented than its Middle Eastern neighbors.
This image was further cemented when Turkey became a member of NATO in 1952. As a pro-Western bloc in the Middle East, democratic Turkey was seen as a natural ally for Israel during the Cold War era. The two countries developed strong military and economic bonds during the 1950s and 1960s.
Soured Relations
However, relations began to sour following the Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem and other territories after the 1967 Six Day War Turkey criticized Israel’s treatment of Palestinians and its settlements in the West Bank and Gaza.
In 1980, Turkey downgraded diplomatic ties and closed its consulate in Jerusalem after Israel declared the entire city its capital. Ties improved again in the 1990s when Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization signed the Oslo Accords.
A Renewed Alliance
Israeli-Turkish relations reached a high point in 1996 when the two countries signed a number of military cooperation agreements This included joint military exercises and training, intelligence sharing, and arms deals.
Turkey even allowed Israeli planes to train in Turkish airspace, seen as a major sign of trust. The 1990s saw billions of dollars in bilateral trade and Israel became one of Turkey’s top export destinations. Hundreds of thousands of Israeli tourists flocked to Turkey’s beaches and bazaars each year.
In the 2000s, Turkey positioned itself as an intermediary between Israel and Syria. Turkey tried unsuccessfully to broker peace deals between Israel and regional rivals like Syria.
A Nadir: The Mavi Marmara Incident
The warm relations hit a nadir in 2010 when Israeli commandos stormed a Turkish humanitarian aid ship called the Mavi Marmara that was trying to break Israel’s blockade of Gaza. Nine Turkish activists were killed in the raid.
Turkey withdrew its ambassador from Israel and expelled the Israeli envoy. Joint military deals were suspended. Turkey called for an official apology, compensation for victims’ families, and an end to the Gaza blockade. Israel refused these demands.
Consequently, Turkey downgraded relations with Israel to the lowest diplomatic level and vowed to isolate Israel economically and politically. More Israeli tourists started vacationing in Greece instead.
Turkey Accepts Israeli Apology…Sort Of
After Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu apologized to Turkey in 2013 for the deaths of Turkish citizens, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan accepted the apology. Diplomatic ties were restored but the friendship remained strained.
Erdogan regularly blasts Israeli policy towards Palestinians. Turkey still expects Israel to pay compensation and allow open access to Gaza. Meanwhile, Israel refuses to meet these demands.
Ongoing Tensions
-
In 2018, Turkey expelled the Israeli ambassador again and recalled its own officials after Israeli forces killed 60 Palestinians protesting along the Gaza border.
-
In 2020, Erdogan called Jerusalem “our city” and threatened to sever ties with any country that relocated their embassy to the city, after the U.S. moved its embassy there.
-
Turkey frequently hosts leaders of Hamas, which Israel considers a terrorist organization. Israel protests these meetings.
-
The two countries routinely trade accusations of human rights abuses regarding Palestinians and Kurds, respectively.
-
Turkey inked a controversial natural gas pipeline deal with Israel’s rivals Egypt and Jordan in 2021, leaving Israel isolated in terms of Mediterranean energy cooperation.
Continued Cooperation
Yet economic ties continue to grow. Bilateral trade reached record levels in 2021 at $6.7 billion. Over 10,000 Israelis visited Turkey in the first half of 2022 alone. The two nations share intelligence on Iranian threats and continue to maintain backchannel relations.
They also cooperate closely on energy pipeline projects in the eastern Mediterranean, compartmentalizing away political squabbles to enable joint economic gain. Strong cultural and tourism connections remain.
Frenemies Forever?
So are Israel and Turkey allies or enemies? The relationship defies simplistic labels. Turkey was the first Muslim-majority nation to establish ties with Israel but hasn’t hesitated to lodge criticism against it. Israel relies on Turkey’s help on some issues but remains wary.
They need each other’s cooperation yet compete for regional influence. There is mutual distrust and resentment alongside pragmatic partnership. In other words, Israel and Turkey appear locked in a state of frenemies.
The love-hate dynamic has endured for decades and will likely persist as long as Erdogan remains in power. Israel and Turkey continue walking a fine line between alliance and antagonism, bound by shared interests yet divided by opposing sympathies. Their turbulent history suggests this fair-weather friendship will experience both sunny days and storms ahead.
Turkish elite vs. societal opinion
KEVIN HUGGARD: To what extent is the Turkish political response to this crisis driven by bottom-up societal demands as opposed to the top-down needs of its political leaders?
ASLI AYDINTAŞBAŞ: No doubt the public is very sensitive to this issue — and in full sympathy with Palestinians. For the ordinary citizen, there is nonstop coverage of the suffering in Gaza and rolling commentary that Israel is able to do this because the United States allows it.
Public criticism of Hamas in the early days after the October 7 carnage is long gone. The picture that emerges in the public conversation is black and white, of the oppressor and the oppressed, with no nuance and barely a memory of what happened on October 7. There is also growing anti-Americanism for what is perceived as the United States’ blank check for Israel.
Erdoğan amplifies those sentiments and brings in an element of legitimization for Hamas by making the case that Hamas is not a terrorist organization. In doing this, he has been able to mold the public’s outlook on the issue: According to polling data from Metropoll, only 30% of respondents believe that Hamas is a terrorist organization.
This conflict has also allowed Erdoğan to make a case about a civilizational rift with the West. He calls it “crusader vs crescent” and of course, Turkey is on the side of the crescent. I worry that more and more people in Turkey are now buying this civilizational argument and think of Turkey as separate from the liberal order — which is described as immoral, bigoted, and hypocritical. I believe that the conflict in Gaza has just pushed Turkish society a few more inches towards the idea of a non-aligned Turkey.
Turkey’s relationship with Israel and the Palestinian territories
KEVIN HUGGARD: What approach has Turkey traditionally taken toward Israeli-Palestinian affairs under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan? How does this issue fit into Turkey’s broader foreign policy?
ASLI AYDINTAŞBAŞ: The Palestinian issue is front and center to Erdoğan’s vision of where he wants to take Turkey.
As two of the non-Arab states in the region, Turkey and Israel have long been fascinated with one another and have enjoyed close ties for much of their 74-year relationship.
But over the past two decades under Erdoğan, relations have been tumultuous, often in parallel with the ups and downs in Israeli-Palestinian tensions. In 2009, Erdoğan walked out of a panel with Shimon Peres in Davos after accusing the former Israeli president of killing children. In 2010, a Turkish aid flotilla tried to break the blockade of Gaza, leading to a deadly Israeli raid and years of cold peace between the two countries.
Although Turkey and Israel normalized ties in 2022, relations have dramatically worsened since Hamas’ October 7 attack and Israel’s military operations in Gaza. Erdoğan has taken a very harsh stance against Israel and the two countries have recalled their ambassadors — though trade relations continue.
Under Erdoğan, Turkey’s approach to the Israeli-Palestinian issue is distinctly different from the pre-Erdoğan, Kemalist period in two ways.
The first is Erdoğan’s belief in the legitimacy of Hamas as a viable Palestinian actor, which is a natural outcome of his ideological affinity for the Muslim Brotherhood. Erdoğan believes Hamas needs to be part of the political process and has moved the Turkish establishment toward that idea. Hamas has had a presence in Turkey and sent delegations there since it won the Palestinian elections in 2006. I should note that Ankara’s engagement is with Hamas’ political wing; as far as I know, there has been no Turkish support for the group’s military wing in Gaza. But Erdoğan has been open about his political support for Hamas — whose political representatives were reportedly in Turkey at the time of the attack.
Another distinction from the pre-Erdoğan age is the central role of the Palestinian issue in Turkey’s aspirations for regional leadership — and Erdoğan’s use of neo-Ottomanism to sell that idea to Turkish voters. The Turkish president has built his political platform on the theme of an ascending Turkey — with a historic responsibility to protect the dispossessed Muslim populations in the region, including, of course, the Palestinians. This notion of Turkish exceptionalism runs through all of Erdoğan’s foreign policy speeches and is at the core of his “Century of Turkey” platform. It also works well domestically for the voters: Erdoğan is the only leader standing up to Israel and the West, we are often told. This is how he wants to be remembered, as the leader who oversaw the rebirth of the Turkish empire and who hasn’t forgotten the Palestinians and Jerusalem.
USA Panics After Turkey Tells Iran To Bring Israel & Allies ‘To Knees’? Biden Aide Calls Up… | Gaza
FAQ
Is Turkey an ally with Israel?
Who is Israel main ally?
Which country is good friend of Israel?
Which countries support Israel?