Even with U.S. intercession, the assassination of a Hamas leader in Tehran could harden Ankara’s stance against Israel and spur a fatal cycle of diplomatic and economic retaliation.
For reasons both political and personal, the killing of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh last week may represent a turning point in Turkey’s ties with Israel. In addition to Ankara’s nearly twenty-year relationship with and support for Hamas, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan knew Haniyeh well, treating him like a family member and protege. In fact, Erdogan had just invited Haniyeh to address parliament shortly before his death, exacerbating the shock and embarrassment of his sudden demise. As such, Erdogan will almost certainly treat the assassination as a personal slight and instruct his bureaucrats to harden the government’s stance toward Israel. Turkish foreign policy decisionmakers and the broader population will back this shift, since many of them already viewed Israel’s campaign against Hamas in the Gaza Strip as misplaced, ill-executed, and stained by civilian casualties.
As a first punitive step, Turkey joined South Africa’s International Court of Justice case against Israel on August 7, aiming to prosecute the country for allegedly committing genocide in Gaza. Although Ankara’s ICJ submission reportedly avoided a commitment to accept the court’s eventual judgment as binding, the high-profile diplomatic move is a sign that other Turkish measures are forthcoming, with probable implications for U.S. policy and Israel-Turkey relations alike.
Turkey and Israel have had a turbulent relationship over the decades, but tensions have reached new heights during Israel’s ongoing war in Gaza. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has made incendiary statements, threatened military intervention, and imposed economic sanctions on Israel But is Turkey actually involved in Israel’s war beyond fiery rhetoric? Let’s examine the evidence.
Erdogan’s Inflammatory Statements
Erdogan has made no secret of his staunch support for Palestinians and disdain for Israel’s actions in Gaza In a July speech, he declared “We need to be very strong so that Israel cannot do these ridiculous things to Palestine. Just as we entered Karabakh, just as we entered Libya, we can do something similar to them.”
This apparent threat of military intervention provoked outrage in Israel, Foreign Minister Israel Katz compared Erdogan to Saddam Hussein and warned he would suffer a similar fate, Turkey’s foreign ministry responded by likening Netanyahu to Hitler and accusing Israel of genocide
Such comparisons to dictators are not new – Erdogan previously equated Netanyahu with Hitler in May 2021 during clashes in Jerusalem. While offensive, these statements alone don’t confirm Turkish military involvement.
Evidence of Turkish Military Intervention?
Erdogan points to Turkey’s interventions in Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh as precedents for acting against Israel. However, the analogy is flawed.
Turkey directly supported the UN-backed Libyan government militarily against rebel commander Khalifa Haftar. This included drone strikes, air defense systems, military advisors and thousands of Syrian mercenaries.
In Nagorno-Karabakh, Turkey assisted ally Azerbaijan with drones and military provisions like the Libya conflict. But there is no evidence Turkey engaged in direct combat.
Critically, Turkey was invited by the Libyan government and was aligned with Azerbaijan. Israel has not invited Turkish intervention, making direct action far more complex.
While Turkey could theoretically launch unilateral strikes on Israel despite the lack of invitation, this would spark a major regional war that likely deters Turkey in reality.
Imposing Economic Sanctions
A more tangible Turkish action against Israel has been economic sanctions. In May 2021, Turkey halted all trade with Israel over violence in Jerusalem. Israel later scrapped its free trade deal with Turkey in retaliation.
These sanctions have severely damaged bilateral trade, but Turkey has been careful to avoid impacting vital energy links. Turkey still facilitates Azerbaijani oil exports to Israel through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline.
So sanctions are largely political signaling, rather than concrete military alignment with Palestinian militant groups. If Turkey truly sought to aid these groups, cutting Israel’s energy imports would be a higher impact move.
Rhetoric Over Action
No credible reports indicate Turkey is supplying Palestinian militants with weapons, intelligence or direct military intervention. Sanctions are relatively limited in scope.
Erdogan’s verbal attacks on Israel resonate with his domestic base and bolster his image as a defender of Muslims worldwide. But Turkey has not matched words with major concrete steps.
Turkey treading cautiously also reflects the complex dynamics of the region. Despite tensions with Israel, Turkey has been building ties with several Arab states and wants to avoid jeopardizing these gains.
For now, Turkey seems unlikely to escalate beyond political rhetoric and limited sanctions. But with an unpredictable leader like Erdogan, the potential for greater Turkish involvement in the conflict remains a simmering risk.
The climate is volatile, and inflammatory words can take on a life of their own. But Turkey has yet to substantively become a direct party to Israel’s war in Gaza beyond expressing vehement opposition. Both sides are likely wary of sparking a dangerous regional war by shifting from fiery rhetoric to military action. Yet with frustrations high on both sides, the risk of unintended escalation remains.
Ankara’s Likely Punitive Measures
Turkey has been taking various actions against Israel since the military campaign in Gaza first began last year, and these measures are set to intensify following the Haniyeh incident. On the diplomatic front, Erdogan has joined other officials in directing harsh rhetoric toward Israel throughout the war, including a May 13 statement accusing it of genocide. On the economic front, Ankara issued a suite of trade restrictions on April 9, then banned all import and export activity with Israel on May 2, announcing that the boycott would persist until a “permanent ceasefire and humanitarian aid are secured in Gaza.”
In response to Haniyeh’s killing, Turkey could widen its toolbox against Israel in several ways:
Blocking NATO cooperation. In addition to joining the ICJ case, Turkey will likely force a full moratorium on NATO cooperation with Israel. The alliance requires unanimous member approval of all decisions, so Ankara has reportedly been able to veto various forms of cooperation since the Gaza war began (e.g., joint meetings and exercises). Although it has stopped short of a full moratorium and allowed certain symbolic measures to pass (e.g., joint statements about the October 7 attack), it may now decide to permanently veto all Israel-related initiates going forward.
Trade sanctions and airspace restrictions. Ankara could clamp down further on the May 2 boycott, closing the loophole that has allowed many Turkish companies to use third countries (e.g., Greece) to continue trading with Israel. It could also cut energy flows from its Mediterranean terminal of Ceyhan, where oil brought in from Azerbaijan via pipeline is currently shipped to Israel. Last but not least, Turkey may consider closing its airspace to commercial planes flying to and from Israel.
“Nuclear” options. Other potential actions could prove serious enough to rupture the relationship indefinitely. For example, a new flotilla has been anchored in Istanbul for months awaiting permission to sail to Gaza and undermine Israel’s blockade; Turkey could decide to give it the green light. Given that the Strip is currently an active war zone, Israel would no doubt confront this flotilla militarily, likely resulting in a repeat of the deadly 2010 confrontation or worse. Other “nuclear” options could include hosting Hamas’s top leadership openly and formally or suspending diplomatic ties with Israel.
One important dynamic that may limit Turkish retaliation is Erdogan’s desire to play a role in Gaza “the day after.” Ankara is eager to participate in reconstructing the Strip, sorting out Palestinian politics, and mediating a long-term solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—both to help the Palestinian people and to cement itself as a regional power. Hence, if Israel sends signals through regional mediators (e.g., the United Arab Emirates) that there could be a role for Turkey in shaping Gaza’s future, Erdogan may be reticent to launch the deeper economic sanctions or “nuclear” options described above.
Even in that scenario, however, Turkey would continue censuring Israel internationally, and Jerusalem may prove unwilling to tolerate further diplomatic rebukes without responding. For example, it might decide to censure Ankara right back—forcefully and consistently—or take actions that threaten Turkish interests in the East Mediterranean, such as doubling down on its alliance with Greece. This could anger Erdogan to the point where he resorts to deeper sanctions after all, among other serious options. Such escalation would in turn trigger problems for U.S.-Turkey relations—especially in Congress, where pro-Greece and pro-Israel voices are traditionally stronger than pro-Turkey voices. Taken together, these developments would almost certainly take the Israel-Turkey relationship across the Rubicon of reparability.
Two Decades of Ties with Hamas
Erdogan first established formal contacts with Hamas rather early in his long reign as Turkey’s head of state, inviting the group’s then-leader Khaled Mashal to Ankara in 2006. At the time, Turkey had excellent ties with Israel, rooted in its 1949 recognition of the Jewish state (for decades, Turkey was Israel’s only Muslim-majority friend). The relationship had also experienced a growth spurt during the 1990s, including a large increase in Israeli tourism to Turkey, various free-trade agreements, high-level visits, and deep intelligence and military cooperation.
Yet these strong ties did not translate into an anti-Palestinian stance—historically, Turkey supported the Palestinian cause even as it developed good relations with Israel. For instance, it established formal ties with the Palestine Liberation Organization in the late 1970s and was among the first countries to recognize the “State of Palestine” in exile in 1988. Ankara also backed the Palestinian Authority after it was established as part of the Oslo peace process in the 1990s.
This dynamic underwent a notable shift after the turn of the century—partly due to Israel’s multiple military clashes with Hamas, but also because Erdogan prioritized ties with the group at the expense of other Palestinian factions, including Fatah, the PA’s leading party. Unlike Israel, the United States, and many other governments, Ankara does not view Hamas as an illegitimate terrorist group, but rather as a legitimate voice of the Palestinian people and a key actor in the struggle against Israel. Hence, Ankara began hosting Hamas officials, first semi-secretly and then quite openly (though it refrained from hosting the group’s top leaders).
Long before the current Gaza war, each cycle of combat in the Strip eroded Turkish goodwill toward Israel, while Ankara’s efforts to help Hamas increasingly angered Jerusalem. As a result, the bilateral relationship has been gradually downgraded from excellent to nearly ruptured. The rift widened into a chasm in 2010, after an “international flotilla” of privately owned ships sailed from Turkey with the aim of ending Israel’s blockade against Hamas-controlled Gaza. When Israeli commandoes boarded the ships, clashes erupted and eight Turkish citizens were killed, along with one U.S.-Turkish dual national. The two countries then severed their diplomatic relations, which were not fully restored until December 2022 after years of U.S. mediation. As part of that reset, Turkey committed to curbing Hamas’s presence on its soil, but the current Gaza war and the Haniyeh assassination threaten to upend all that progress and throw the relationship into an even deeper abyss. And this time, Washington will be hard-pressed to bring it back from the brink.
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