While the war on Gaza led to a verbal escalation between Ankara and Tel Aviv, relations between Israel and Turkey have survived, given the strong links and similarities between the two countries.
Turkey’s first reaction to the unleashing of Israel’s war on Gaza surprised observers by its cautious tone, just as its reaction to the invasion of Ukraine had surprised by its legalism, insisting on the need to respect Kiev’s sovereignty. In both cases, Ankara, which maintains strong and steady relations with the two aggressor nations, has openly offered its mediation, as already in the past. In both cases too, the ambivalence detectable in that offer is not merely due to the conjuncture. It also reflects the fundamental nature of that country’s diplomacy, often forced to accomplish perilous balancing acts in the course of its history.
On 7 October 2023 when Hamas launched its unexpected attack, Turkey and Israel were during a process of reconciliation, after more than a decade of uneven relations bordering at times on divorce before entering laborious periods of reconciliation. The capacity to manage this volatility is the first source of surprise. It is due to multiple convergences, political, strategic and above all economic. What is the future of this complex relationship in view of the new situation brought about by the return to centre stage in the Middle East of the Israel-Palestine conflict?
As Turkey was the first Muslim country to recognise Israel in 1949, shortly after the creation of the Hebrew State, the two countries have long been partners and know each other well. After a few muted skirmishes caused by the Israeli-Arab confits during the cold war, their mutual relations have been very positive since the end of the bipolar world. Nor has the rise to power of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) at the turn of the century appear to have called into question that ‘entente cordiale’. In 2008 Ankara even hosted unofficial negotiations aimed at enabling Israel and the Syrian regime to normalise their relations, negotiations which failed to achieve their purpose.
It was not so much the Palestinian question as it was the new situation created by the rise to power of Hamas in the Gaza Strip resulting from the 2006 elections which was at the origin of the Turko-Israeli quarrel which began in 2009. When Israel launched its first campaign of massive bombings on the Palestinian enclave, dubbed ‘Operation Cast lead’, Ankara was quick to react. In a memorable panel meeting during the January 2009 Davos economic forum, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan castigated Israeli President, Shimon Pérès in no uncertain terms.
From that point on, the new Turkish government was seen to draw close to Hamas, seeking to make it an official partner in the negotiations. A year later, Turkish-Israeli relations were on the verge of breaking down altogether when the Mavi Marmara, flagship of a humanitarian flotilla chartered by a Turkish Islamic organisation, tried to force the Gaza blockade. Nine Turkish humanitarian workers were killed when the ship was intercepted and the ties between the two countries appeared to be irremediably compromised.
However, in 2013, in a completely unprecedented gesture, Benyamin Netanyahu agreed to offer Erdoğan the apologies he was demanding to restore their relations. Hoover, this initiative was compromised in 2014 by a new campaign of air strikes on Gaza, ‘Protective Edge’ which the leader of the AKP denounced, accusing Israel of having ‘outdone Hitler in barbarity’.1 Consequently, it was not until 2016, after compensation had been paid to the families of the victims of the humanitarian flotilla that high-level diplomatic relations were restored with an exchange of ambassadors. But the truce would not last long.
In 2019, the Gazans’ Great March of Return was severely repressed with many Palestinian casualties, prompting a new verbal confrontation between the Turkish President and the Israeli Prime Minister. Another downturn in diplomatic relations ensued and it was not until 2022 and Israeli President Isaac Herzog’s trip to Turkey that the two countries again exchanged ambassadors, in a context where Ankara was trying to iron out its disputes with the Arab world (Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia…) and when the latter appeared to have entered into a phase of global convergence with Israel, following the Abraham accords.
More than its inconstancy, what strikes one today beyond this lasting quarrel is the resiliency which has, in the end, preserved the relationship between the two protagonists. For neither the interception of a humanitarian ship, nor the increasingly intensive air strikes against Gaza, nor the very harsh verbal duels between rulers, nor the bloody repression of Palestinian demonstrations were able to get the better of the fragile links between those two regional powers.
Israel and Turkey may seem like very different countries on the surface, but a deeper look reveals some surprising similarities between the two. Here are the key things that Israel and Turkey have in common:
Religious Nationalism
Both Israel and Turkey are examples of countries where religious identity and nationalism are deeply intertwined.
In Israel Jewish identity plays a central role in the national narrative and politics. Israel was founded as a Jewish homeland and being Jewish is deeply tied to Israeli citizenship and national belonging. The 2018 Nation State Law constitutionally enshrined Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people.
Similarly, in Turkey, Sunni Islam has been incorporated into Turkish national identity since the founding of the modern republic. Being Muslim was made part of what it means to be Turkish, even as Turkey sought to build a secular state. Under Erdogan, Turkey has seen a revival of religion in the public sphere and Islamist politics.
So while the specific religions are different, both countries exemplify how religion and national identity can be fused together to create a religious nationalism.
Transforming Religious Tradition
In both Israel and Turkey, the traditional religious tradition (Judaism and Sunni Islam, respectively) had to be transformed and adapted to fit the modern nation-state.
In Turkey, the Islamic caliphate system had to be recalibrated to subordinate religion to the homogenizing forces of Turkification and nationalist myths of common origins. The ummah became redefined from the diverse Muslim community worldwide to just Turkish Muslims within one state.
In Israel, political Zionism also represented a break from traditional diasporic Judaism. Settling on the land and creating a Jewish nation-state required renegotiating the notion of Zion. No longer just a metaphysical destination, it became the physical homeland of the Jewish people.
So the secular, modern concept of the nation-state necessitated reconfiguring traditional religious ideas in both countries.
Contested Secularism
Both Israel and Turkey are constitutionally secular states, but the role of religion in the public sphere is hotly contested in each. Issues like observance of religious law, the status of religious minorities, and religion’s place in state policy are ongoing sources of debate.
In Israel, the balance between Jewish identity and democratic secularism has always been tense. Debates over the religious character of the Israeli state and the role of Jewish law have been constant. The 2018 Nation State Law shifted this balance towards Jewish identity.
In Turkey, the meaning of secularism or laïcité set forth by Ataturk has been challenged by Islamists like Erdogan who want a more public role for religion. Issues like headscarves and religious education illustrate the ongoing clashes over secularism.
So despite secular legal frameworks, managing religion’s role in public life remains a profound challenge in both nations.
Regional Power Ambitions
Both Israel and Turkey harbor ambitions of exerting regional political and cultural influence in their respective neighborhoods. Israel aims to be the preeminent power in the Middle East, while Turkey has neo-Ottoman ambitions of leadership in the Balkans, North Africa, and Middle East.
This sometimes puts the countries’ ambitions and policies in competition. For example, after the Arab Spring, both Israel and Turkey jockeyed for influence through relationships with different political factions. And Turkey has positioned itself as a champion for Palestinians to bolster its leadership credentials in the Muslim world.
So the two countries share a desire to be regional power players, which can foster rivalry.
Chromaticism in Foreign Policy
Linked to their ambitions, both Israel and Turkey have practiced flexible, chromatic foreign policies. Chromaticism refers to pursuing contradictory alliances and policies between global powers.
Israel has long maintained strong ties with the United States, while still engaging in trade, arms deals, and coordination with Russia and China.
Similarly, Turkey is a NATO member that has often bucked alliance preferences to strengthen ties with Russia. Under Erdogan, it has engaged in a whipsawing foreign policy trying to balance Western alignment with regional interests.
This chromaticism reflects the complex geopolitical positioning of both states.
The role of the Jewish community
To understand how Turkish-Israeli relations have survived and been regularly revived, it is important to identify what it is that has structured them enduringly. The solidity of their economic ties constitutes the first axis of that continuity. As proof of this, we need only remember that during the conflictual years that we have just described, Turkey tripled its exports to Israel, which roos from 2.3 billion dollars in 2011 to 7.03 billion in 2022. Providing 5.2% of the country’s imports, Turkey is thus Israel’s fifth-largest supplier and its seventh-largest customer for 2.2% of its exports, to the tune of 2.5 billion dollars per annum. These trade relations concern vital domains. Heading the list of Israeli importations from Turkey are steel, iron, textiles, motor vehicles and cement, not to mention the Azerbaijani oil which transits via the Caucus and Eastern Anatolia through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline (BTC) to Ceyhan harbour and covers 40% of Israel’s annual consumption of brut. The Turkish corporation Zorlu also provides 7% of Israel’s electricity. As for Israel, its exports to Turkey consist mostly of chemical products and high-tech equipment. These have played a substantial role in the modernisation of Turkish industrial production over recent years, especially in the manufacture of armaments.
A shared historical memory constitutes another aspect of the relations between these two nations which helps to overcome the vagaries of their mutual relations. Jews were one of the ‘Millets’2 of the Ottoman Empire which granted refuge, especially in its emblematic port cities (Salonica, Istanbul, Izmir…) to the Sephardi Jews driven out of Spain in the Fifteenth Century. Despite the unequal situation which has been theirs since the birth of the Turkish Republic, as evinced by various anti-Semitic episodes during and after WW2, they reman one of the last Jewish communities in the Muslim world, in a country that does not reject them as was shown recently in the Turkish TV series Kulup, based on scrupulous observation of their linguistic and cultural specificities. This past and this atmosphere have contributed to the flood of Israeli tourists to Turkey where, despite the successive crises, they go again and again, representing before October 2023, one of the country’s largest complements of foreign visitors.
And finally, however conflictual the climate surrounding their relations, we must not underestimate the importance of the strategic interests which the two countries have in common. Turkey remains an ally of the West since it belongs to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and hosts important bases: headquarters for the allied land forces of the Alliance’s South flank at Izmir, anti-ballistic missile radar station at Kürecik, mainly directed towards Iran, and Incirlik airport which serves if required as a relay for the shipment of military equipment to Israel. In February 2024, Ankara joined the anti-missile European Sky Shield Initiative, based on a 2023 German initiative and supported by 17 countries. This project, shunned by France, will use among other equipment, the Israeli long-range Arrow 3 missiles.
Besides which, neither country is about abandoning its lasting conflict with Syria. After a series of military interventions carried out in 2018, Ankara has taken over strips of land straddling its border with Syria, administering, and equipping them ever since, even if it claims to have no irredentist ambitions but wants mostly to prevent the implantation of People’s Protection Units (YPG), the Kurdish militia affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). As for Israel, in the context of the ongoing conflicts, its army regularly launches strikes against the positions o f the Syrian regime and its regional allies (the Lebanese Hezbollah) with Russian approval if necessary.
Although considerable disagreements have been expressed by officials of both countries concerning their commitments in the Caucuses, a strategic convergence was observed in 2020 during the second Nagorno-Karabakh war, in which both provided Azerbaijan with precious military backing and ultimately made possible its regaining control of the Armenian enclave.
In the Shadow of Gaza
While the war on Gaza led to a verbal escalation between Ankara and Tel Aviv, relations between Israel and Turkey have survived, given the strong links and similarities between the two countries.
- Translations:
- français
- عربي
- English
- فارسى
Translated from French by Noël Burch.
Turkey’s first reaction to the unleashing of Israel’s war on Gaza surprised observers by its cautious tone, just as its reaction to the invasion of Ukraine had surprised by its legalism, insisting on the need to respect Kiev’s sovereignty. In both cases, Ankara, which maintains strong and steady relations with the two aggressor nations, has openly offered its mediation, as already in the past. In both cases too, the ambivalence detectable in that offer is not merely due to the conjuncture. It also reflects the fundamental nature of that country’s diplomacy, often forced to accomplish perilous balancing acts in the course of its history.
On 7 October 2023 when Hamas launched its unexpected attack, Turkey and Israel were during a process of reconciliation, after more than a decade of uneven relations bordering at times on divorce before entering laborious periods of reconciliation. The capacity to manage this volatility is the first source of surprise. It is due to multiple convergences, political, strategic and above all economic. What is the future of this complex relationship in view of the new situation brought about by the return to centre stage in the Middle East of the Israel-Palestine conflict?
As Turkey was the first Muslim country to recognise Israel in 1949, shortly after the creation of the Hebrew State, the two countries have long been partners and know each other well. After a few muted skirmishes caused by the Israeli-Arab confits during the cold war, their mutual relations have been very positive since the end of the bipolar world. Nor has the rise to power of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) at the turn of the century appear to have called into question that ‘entente cordiale’. In 2008 Ankara even hosted unofficial negotiations aimed at enabling Israel and the Syrian regime to normalise their relations, negotiations which failed to achieve their purpose.
It was not so much the Palestinian question as it was the new situation created by the rise to power of Hamas in the Gaza Strip resulting from the 2006 elections which was at the origin of the Turko-Israeli quarrel which began in 2009. When Israel launched its first campaign of massive bombings on the Palestinian enclave, dubbed ‘Operation Cast lead’, Ankara was quick to react. In a memorable panel meeting during the January 2009 Davos economic forum, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan castigated Israeli President, Shimon Pérès in no uncertain terms.
From that point on, the new Turkish government was seen to draw close to Hamas, seeking to make it an official partner in the negotiations. A year later, Turkish-Israeli relations were on the verge of breaking down altogether when the Mavi Marmara, flagship of a humanitarian flotilla chartered by a Turkish Islamic organisation, tried to force the Gaza blockade. Nine Turkish humanitarian workers were killed when the ship was intercepted and the ties between the two countries appeared to be irremediably compromised.
However, in 2013, in a completely unprecedented gesture, Benyamin Netanyahu agreed to offer Erdoğan the apologies he was demanding to restore their relations. Hoover, this initiative was compromised in 2014 by a new campaign of air strikes on Gaza, ‘Protective Edge’ which the leader of the AKP denounced, accusing Israel of having ‘outdone Hitler in barbarity’.1 Consequently, it was not until 2016, after compensation had been paid to the families of the victims of the humanitarian flotilla that high-level diplomatic relations were restored with an exchange of ambassadors. But the truce would not last long.
In 2019, the Gazans’ Great March of Return was severely repressed with many Palestinian casualties, prompting a new verbal confrontation between the Turkish President and the Israeli Prime Minister. Another downturn in diplomatic relations ensued and it was not until 2022 and Israeli President Isaac Herzog’s trip to Turkey that the two countries again exchanged ambassadors, in a context where Ankara was trying to iron out its disputes with the Arab world (Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia…) and when the latter appeared to have entered into a phase of global convergence with Israel, following the Abraham accords.
More than its inconstancy, what strikes one today beyond this lasting quarrel is the resiliency which has, in the end, preserved the relationship between the two protagonists. For neither the interception of a humanitarian ship, nor the increasingly intensive air strikes against Gaza, nor the very harsh verbal duels between rulers, nor the bloody repression of Palestinian demonstrations were able to get the better of the fragile links between those two regional powers.
Turkey-Israel relations in a changing geopolitical landscape
FAQ
What is the relationship between Turkey and Israel?
Does Turkey support Palestine or Israel?
What does Turkey import from Israel?
|
Turkey Imports from Israel
|
Value
|
Year
|
|
Articles of iron or steel
|
$1.84M
|
2022
|
|
Soaps, lubricants, waxes, candles, modelling pastes
|
$1.64M
|
2022
|
|
Salt, sulphur, earth, stone, plaster, lime and cement
|
$1.51M
|
2022
|
|
Glass and glassware
|
$1.50M
|
2022
|
How is Turkey from Israel?
What do Turkey and Israel have in common?
A Different Take on Religious Nationalism Israel’s 2018 Nation State Law and Turkey’s reversion of Hagia Sophia into a mosque in 2020 have sparked discussions about the power of national identity and religious nationalism.
Does Israel have a good relationship with Turkey?
In early 2006, the Israeli Foreign Ministry described its country’s relations with Turkey as “perfect.” In November 2007, Israeli President Shimon Pere s met with Turkish President Abdullah Gül and addressed the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.
Why is Turkey important to Israel?
Turkey is also important to Israel’s national security for, among other things, allowing closer Israeli intelligence monitoring of Iran. In addition, the Israelis hope that improved ties with Turkey will put pressure on Hamas, which has established a presence in Istanbul and run operations from Turkey over the last decade.
Why did Israel reassess relations with Turkey?
On 28 October 2023, Israel withdrew its diplomats from Turkey to reassess the relations between the two countries, according to a statement by Israel‘s foreign minister Eli Cohen. This move came in the aftermath of comments by Turkish President Erdogan, accusing Israel of war crimes in the occupied Palestinian Territories.