Erdogans stance has been pro-Ukrainian but not anti-Russian, enabling him to strike a delicate balance between NATO expectations, Moscow’s economic lifeline, and domestic political pressures.
Ankara’s Ukraine war policy could be best described as non-binary. On the one hand, Turkey supports Ukraine militarily, providing Kyiv with essential defensive and attack hardware, such as the Bayraktar drones. On the other hand, Turkey has kept ties with Russia open economically, gifting Moscow with crucial access to global trade, markets, and airspace.
What is more, politically Turkey has embraced a neutral position between Ukraine and Russia, bringing the two countries together, most recently around the July 2022 grain corridor deal, an important achievement for Ankara that has alleviated food security risks for many Middle East and African nations. This underlines Turkey’s role globally and regionally as a rare (and necessary) power that can talk to Russia and Ukraine alike. In other words, in Ukraine, Ankara has been having their cake and eating it too. This policy also closely serves the interests of Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who faces presidential and parliamentary elections in spring 2023.
Is Turkey Close to Ukraine? Exploring the Complex Turkey-Ukraine Relationship
Turkey and Ukraine have a long history of close geographical, cultural, and economic ties. However, their political relationship has become more complicated in recent years due to shifting allegiances in the region. This article examines the multifaceted Turkey-Ukraine relationship and analyzes how close the two countries really are today.
Historical Ties Between Turkey and Ukraine
Turkey was one of the first countries to recognize Ukraine’s independence after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Diplomatic relations were quickly established, with Turkey opening an embassy in Kyiv and Ukraine opening an embassy in Ankara.
The two countries share deep historical connections. Many Ukrainians trace their ancestry back to Turkic nomadic tribes that inhabited the region centuries ago. Today the Crimean Tatars are an ethnic Turkic group native to Crimea in southern Ukraine.
Economically, Turkey and Ukraine have aimed to strengthen ties. In 2011, the countries agreed to form a free trade zone to boost bilateral trade, however the plan was put on hold in 2013. Tourism has also connected the populations, with Ukraine emerging as a popular vacation spot for Turkish tourists in recent years.
Diverging Allegiances: Turkey’s Balancing Act Between Russia and Ukraine
While Turkey and Ukraine have cooperation on many fronts, their political alliance has faltered amid regional tensions, namely the conflict between Ukraine and Russia.
This delicate balancing act for Turkey became especially pronounced after Russia annexed Crimea from Ukraine in 2014. While Turkey refused to recognize the legitimacy of Russia’s seizure of Crimea, it also declined to join international sanctions against Moscow.
Turkey’s measured response was largely driven by its complex economic and political relationship with Russia. Turkey imports most of its energy needs from Russia, including natural gas and oil. And in the Syrian civil war, Russia’s support for Syrian President Assad put it at odds with Turkey. But the two countries have attempted to compartmentalize and maintain relations in other spheres.
The outbreak of full-scale war between Russia and Ukraine in February 2022 has forced Turkey once again to strike a delicate balance. Despite selling drones to Ukraine that were used against Russian forces, Turkey has refrained from providing direct military assistance or imposing sanctions on Russia.
Turkish officials justified their neutral stance as necessary to keep communication channels open with both sides. In March 2022, Turkey hosted the first in-person talks between Russian and Ukrainian negotiators, positioning itself as a potential mediator.
Turkey’s Limited Support for Ukraine
While Turkey has not endorsed Russia’s invasion, its support for Ukraine has been limited for several reasons:
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Dependence on Russian energy and tourism: Turkey imports 45% of its natural gas from Russia and Ukraine War could risk vital gas supplies. Russia also provides a major source of tourists along Turkey’s Black Sea coast.
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Opposition to Western sanctions: Turkey remains committed to maintaining economic ties with Russia and has strongly opposed efforts to remove Russia from the SWIFT international payments system.
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Leverage over Syria policy: Turkey continues to see Russia as a partner in achieving its goals in northern Syria, namely preventing Kurdish territorial gains.
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Commitment to Montreux Convention: Turkey did prohibit Russian warships from passing through the Turkish Straits to the Black Sea under the 1936 Montreux Convention. But Turkey has avoided further direct confrontation with Russia.
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Strained ties with NATO: Turkey’s relations with NATO allies have been strained, especially after Ankara acquired advanced Russian S-400 missile defense systems in 2017. This disconnect has inhibited coordination with NATO on the Ukraine crisis.
Domestic Political Calculations
Another major factor shaping Turkey’s response is domestic politics. President Erdogan faces an economic crisis and tough election in mid-2023. The Ukraine crisis risks further increasing inflation and economic hardship for Turks. Erdogan likely wants to avoid Russian retaliation that could worsen Turkey’s economic woes ahead of the election.
Moreover, a recent opinion poll found that only 28% of Turks approve of joining Western sanctions against Russia. With his popularity falling, Erdogan seems inclined to align with prevailing public sentiment in Turkey to avoid further electoral backlash.
Ongoing Uncertainty in Turkey-Ukraine Ties
The Russia-Ukraine War has illuminated the delicate balancing act Turkey has engaged in between its historic ties with Ukraine and its strategic economic and political interests with Russia. While Ankara has supported Ukraine’s sovereignty, its reluctance to confront Russia directly reflects competing priorities.
Looking ahead, the trajectory of Turkey-Ukraine relations remains uncertain. If Russia continues military advances and entrenches its control over eastern and southern Ukraine, Turkey may face growing pressure from Ukraine and the West to bolster its support.
Much depends on the outcome of the conflict and Turkey’s own domestic political and economic conditions. While Turkey is likely to continue engaging with both Russia and Ukraine, its ability to remain neutral in the midst of war is growing increasingly difficult. The complex Turkey-Ukraine relationship faces deepening geopolitical challenges on the horizon.
Erdogan Keeps Ties with Russia Open Economically…
Notwithstanding its strong military support to Ukraine, Turkey has maintained economic ties with Russia since the beginning of the war. Ankara has refused to come on board with U.S. or European Union (EU)-led sanctions and is subsequently—if inadvertently—providing a lifeline for Russian president Vladimir Putin. “Inadvertently” for Ankara, since Turkey supports Ukraine militarily, whereas Turkish president Erdogan needs to keep his country’s ties with Russia open economically to win elections.
Erdogan faces overlapping parliamentary and presidential elections in 2023, likely to be held in April-May. Turkey’s chief executive since 2003 and a front-runner in over a dozen nationwide polls, he has never won elections while not delivering growth. In this regard, Erdogan now faces a challenge: Turkey’s macroeconomic stability is in question, with volatile markets and currency exchange boards and yearly inflation nearing triple digits.
In fact, Turkey’s economy has been unstable since 2018 when the country entered a brief recession. Moreover, economic indicators were in such dismal shape by early 2022 that analysts predicted a meltdown in the country’s economy—and with that Erdogan’s base would disappear by the end of the year. However, that has not happened—largely thanks to substantial financial inflows from and increased trade with Russia that Erdogan has secured, all notwithstanding Ankara’s military support to Ukraine in the war.
In this regard, Erdogan, an astute politician, has created an opportunity out of the Ukraine crisis. Given Turkey’s advanced and diversified economy and physical proximity to Russia, as well as deep trade and business ties between the two countries since the end of the Cold War, Turkey’s openness to Russia since the Ukraine war has resulted in significant financial inflows from Russia in the following areas:
Trade: When the Russian and Turkish leaders met in Sochi in August, they agreed to strengthen their two countries’ economic ties and hinted that they were close to a trade deal. Official data shows that total exports from Turkey to Russia in 2022 increased to $8 billion from $5.7 billion in 2021.
Tourism: Turkey has refused to join EU sanctions targeting air travel to and from Russia, subsequently connecting Russian airports and citizens to international airspace and global hubs. Accordingly, streams of Russians have visited Turkey, with many others choosing the country over other destinations. Some 5.3 million Russians visited Turkey in 2022, significantly recovering from the pandemic low of 2.1 million in 2020 and closer to the pre-pandemic record of 7 million in 2019.
Russians buying Turkish citizenship: Wealthy Russians are able to obtain Turkish citizenship through Turkey’s citizenship-by-investment scheme, which requires a $400,000 investment in the country. Many choose to invest in real estate—at least 12,960 Russian nationals purchased houses in Turkey since the onset of the war in Ukraine, according to official data from TURKSTAT, Turkey’s statistics agency. Russians were also the top nationality in 2022 to own a residency permit in Turkey, according to government data.
Turkey has also been a top destination for sanctioned Russian oligarchs who have purchased luxury real estate in the country, parking their mega-yachts in Turkish marinas in the Mediterranean to avoid their seizure by European governments who have sanctioned Russia and its wealthy elites.
Putin’s gift to Erdogan: Ankara’s openness to trade and contacts with Moscow—providing Russia’s economy with access to global markets and Russia’s citizens, including oligarchs, with connections to the outside world—has pleased Putin. Russian oligarchs, who were supposed to stand up to Putin if denied access to the French Riviera, too, are pleased with Erdogan. They can now travel to and vacation along the Turkish Riviera, perhaps equally as impressive as the French coastline. Together with Turkey’s slowing down of NATO’s Nordic expansion (a process driven by non-Ukraine war dynamics, but ultimately undermining NATO unity), these factors have led Putin to show generosity towards Erdogan.
In July 2022, Putin wire-transferred $5 billion to Turkey towards the construction of the Akkuyu Nuclear Power station being built along the southern Anatolian coast. While the money was sent to the account of Rosatom, the Russian company building the power station, Russian cash trickled across the Turkish economy, providing temporary relief for ordinary citizens from hyperinflation, while allowing Turkish banks to roll over their international debt. The sudden infusion of a lump sum of Russian cash into Turkey’s fledgling economy in July 2022 helped stop the erosion of Erdogan’s base. In fact, recent surveys show that support for the Turkish leader has been picking up since the summer of 2022.
Together with other financial inflows from Saudi Arabia and Qatar, the inflows from Russia and Putin’s “special gift” helped Turkey’s economy come back from the brink in 2022, and Erdogan has survived. Overall, Erdogan has used the war well to Ankara’s—and his own—advantage.
Turkey Backs Ukraine Militarily
To put it simply, Ankara will not allow Kyiv to fall under Moscow’s thumb. To this end, Turkey supports Ukraine militarily and will continue to do so as long as the war rages. This is rooted in Turkey’s view of Ukraine as an important ally in the balance of power around the Black Sea. The only maritime access to the Black Sea is through the Turkish Straits (namely, the Bosphorus, along which Istanbul is located, and the Dardanelles). The 1936 Montreux Convention, which regulates maritime access to the Black Sea, has set Turkey as a gatekeeper of sorts of the Black Sea.
The Convention allows only the littoral states (Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Ukraine, and Turkey) to maintain large and permanent navies on the Black Sea. Of these states, only Russia and Turkey have large navies, a fact that renders the Black Sea—effectively—a Russo-Turkish condominium per Montreux. With Russia being Turkey’s historic nemesis and a larger power militarily when compared to Turkey, Ankara cultivates good ties with the four other Black Sea nations in order to build a balancing block against Moscow around the Black Sea.
In this regard, Ukraine, the third largest Black Sea nation by population and territory after Turkey and Russia and the fourth largest by the size of its economy, looms especially large in Ankara’s strategic thinking. Ankara has maintained good ties with Ukraine since that country’s independence in 1991, cultivating it as a key ally against Russia.
Turkey has other reasons to support Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression, including those rooted in its historic connections with Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula, occupied by Russia since 2014. The Turkic Crimean Khanate was in a privileged commonwealth within the Ottoman Empire until the late eighteenth century, when Tsarina Catherine the Great annexed it. Russia subsequently expelled many of Crimea’s Tatar inhabitants. Stalin deported the remaining Tatar population on the peninsula en masse to Central Asia.
Of the groups deported by Stalin at the end of World War Two, Tatars were uniquely singled out by Moscow after Stalin’s death: the Soviet Union’s successive leaders refused them the right of return to their homeland. This underlines Russia’s strategic focus, from Catherine the Great to Vladimir Putin, on the peninsula as a strategic gateway to the warm seas, embellished with a deep-water harbor (Sebastopol). Only following the collapse of the Soviet Union and under an independent Ukraine were Tatars able to return to Crimea, a fact that Ankara appreciates and supports. Turkey will therefore strive to maintain Ukraine’s sovereignty while helping Kyiv undermine Moscow’s rule over Crimea and across its occupied territories in general.
Accordingly, Turkey has provided Ukraine with key military hardware, including the Bayraktar drones, which played a role in the April 2022 sinking of the Russian naval vessel Moskva and the November 2022 Ukrainian drone attack on the Crimean port city of Sebastopol, home to a key Russian naval base. Perhaps even more fatefully, the Bayraktars helped defeat the (initial) blitzkrieg-style Russian attack against the Ukrainian capital Kyiv during the first weeks of the war in February-March 2022.
War in Ukraine: Turkey closes access to Black Sea straits to warships • FRANCE 24 English
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